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Abstract  
Research on the Chinese media has concentrated on understanding Party-state control 
over an increasingly commercialized media. And it has usually focussed on reporting 
issues over which the central Party-state has a clear and unified position. This article 
explores how the Chinese media reported a domestic policy issue – health reform – on 
which the Party-state had no unified position. It examines three print publications 
during a major health care system review and consultation between 2005 and 2009 to 
see how much diversity there was in the reporting, what the principal narratives were, 
and which actors had voice. It finds the media take diverse positions, with narratives 
centring on market and state roles in health, but a vocal minority of pro-market 
articles challenged the dominant pro-state reporting. But pro-state positions were 
populist and paternalist, speaking for “the people” rather than giving them a direct 
voice. The neo-liberal, pro-market challenge, meanwhile, was elitist, with the media 
venturing only at the margins to demand rights for vulnerable people and greater 
public participation in policy making. 
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Introduction: media control, commercialization and diversity 
Over the last two decades, political scientists have studied closely the transformation 
of China’s media. The media play a pivotal role in politics – usually as objects of 
control in authoritarian states and, at least in theory, as government watchdogs and 
public forums for a plurality of voices in liberal democracies (e.g. Curran, 2005; 
Scammell and Semetko, 2000). The Chinese media’s commercialization from the 
early 1990s has therefore been seized on to gauge its authoritarian rulers’ ability to 
suppress diverse voices, with research focusing predominantly on the tension between 
the mechanisms of party-state control and the market incentives for newspapers to 
ignore or circumvent them (Lee, 2000; Lee, He, and Huang, 2006; Smith, 2002; Tong 
and Sparks, 2009; Wang, 2010; Winfield and Peng, 2005; Zhao, 1998, 2000).  
 
Researchers have found that the Chinese state has wide-ranging and often effective 
control mechanisms for what are considered highly sensitive social and political 
issues, particularly in the reporting of foreign affairs and domestic dissent 
(Stockmann, 2011; Smith, 2002). Stockmann (2011) did find a degree of diversity in 
coverage of the United States on topics unrelated to its relationship with China. And 
others have found the media do often report critically, especially in the contexts of 
disasters and in ‘isolated’ cases of wrongdoing, where blame can be pinned on low 
level cadres and diverted away from high ranking party officials and the central 
government (He, 2000; for TV see Chan, 2002; Zhang, 2006). Smith’s (2002) study 
of the press also found some openness in reporting of problems associated with 
economic reforms. Overall, however, research has found that “though there is some 
variation in media content, the ability of the regime to constrain news reporting is still 
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sufficient to ensure that newspapers generally do not divert much from the position of 
the government” (Stockmann and Gallagher, 2011: 442-3). 
  
Most studies, however, have examined the reporting of issues where one would 
expect “the government’s” position to be unified  and where it would want to ensure 
control – for example incidents of protest and dissent or official wrongdoings that 
threaten or reflect badly on the Party-state, or foreign policy topics where alternative 
views might undermine it. By contrast there has been little study of coverage of 
domestic policy issues where actors within the government take different positions. 
Yuezhi Zhao (2003) studied reporting of China’s decision to join the WTO, but this 
was a foreign policy issue on which China’s top leaders had a clear (pro-joining) 
position. Economic elites were also uniformly in favor. It is therefore unsurprising 
that she found a media consensus on the benefits of joining this international 
institution. 
 
Our paper is original in examining the diversity and content of early 21st century 
Chinese media reporting through a study of a major domestic policy issue – health 
care reform – on which the central government did not have a unified stance. 
Different ministries in the central government took different positions on the direction 
of health reform and Chinese journalists have reported that they had a free hand to 
report on it (Kornreich, Vertinsky and Potter, 2012). 1  The Chinese media did, 
moreover, take a great interest in the early 21st century health reforms. Health had 
become a hot media topic during the 2003 SARS crisis, and so the media followed 
closely a major government review of the health care system between 2005 and 2009. 
Indeed, it has even been asserted – though not on the basis of any systematic research 
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– that the media played a substantial role in the health policy review during this 
period, contributing to “a national discussion about the health system”  (Bloom, 2011: 
1307; see also Zhang, Fang, and Bloom, 2009), and providing a platform for elite 
debate (Kornreich, Vertinsky, and Potter, 2012). 
 
Our study goes beyond the usual questions of whether media marketization and 
technological developments are undermining Party-state control and creating space 
for oppositional voices (for example Huang, 2007; Lee, 2000; Zhao, 2000), to look at 
whether there was in fact a mediated public discussion or elite debate about this key 
policy issue and, if so, who was represented in it. Research across a range of liberal 
democracies, including the United States (US), has systematically shown that political 
and economic elites generally dominate media debates, with government sources (see 
Bennett and Livingston, 2003; Bennett, 1990; Cook, 1998; Lawrence, 2000, chapter 
1) and powerful interest groups (Binderkrantz, 2012; Danielian and Page, 1994; 
Wolsfled, 2011) especially well-represented. Organized non-elite groups, however, 
have had a small but growing voice (Binderkrantz, 2012). Zhao has indicated in late 
20th century China a more marketized media in some cases privileged the narratives of 
governmental and economic elites (Zhao, 1998, 2003). Our paper considers therefore 
not only how diverse the opinions were in the media’s reporting of domestic health 
reform policies, but also whether (and to what extent) certain elite voices were 
privileged and whether non-elite voices were evident late in the first decade of the 21st 
century.  
 
Our paper at the same time helps uncover media narratives of health system reform. 
We examine how the media – and the voices that dominate them – portray the health 
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system’s problems and their causes, as well as the solutions they propose. The 
narratives that emerge are important not only for what they tell health researchers 
about China’s health system and the debates that are shaping it. They may also reveal 
something about the ideological underpinnings of positions taken in the media 
reporting of health care reform. These are important in turn because they may 
underpin wider narratives of reform and debates over the direction of China’s political 
economy.  
 
Methodology  
To assess the extent of media diversity and understand narratives of health reform as 
well as the voices that dominate them, we quantitatively and qualitatively analyzed 
the reporting in three major national Chinese print publications. To reflect the range 
of publications that characterize China’s press, we selected one “official” and one 
“market-oriented” newspaper as well as one independent, commercially successful 
magazine (this draws on categorizations used by Stockmann, 2011; Zhao, 2003). 
People’s Daily (Renmin ribao, 人民日报), is the national newspaper of the Chinese 
Communist Party and the most likely to be Party-state controlled or guided. Beijing 
Youth News (Beijing qingnianbao, 北京青年报) is one of a new generation of semi-
official commercially-oriented newspapers that attract a wide readership using a mix 
of crime, sports, and economic success stories but without generally challenging the 
government’s position on sensitive political and social issues (Smith 2002: 1656). 
Caijing (财经) is an independent business magazine with a reputation for critical 
reporting – including the Chinese government’s handling of the 2003 SARS outbreak 
(Winfield and Peng, 2005). It has a neo-liberal, pro-market orientation and a 
readership drawn mostly from business, government and academic circles.2  
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We analyzed all the articles published on health system reform in the (Chinese) print 
versions of our three outlets between during a period when the health system 
underwent major review: from 1 June 2005, when there was the first flurry of media 
interest in a new wave of health reform to the end of April 2009 the month in which 
the Party-state published a major decision on a new direction for the health care 
system. We identified these articles – 196 in total – through systematic searches of the 
relevant electronic databases: the China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI, at 
www.cnki.net) newspaper database for People’s Daily, and the websites of Caijing 
and Beijing Youth News. We searched using the key words “health reform” (yigai, 医
改 and yiliao gaige, 医疗改革), filtering out any articles originally published in other 
papers, and any that did not appear in the print version of our sampled outlets. We 
then discarded any articles that did not focus on health system reform. Our final 
sample of 196 therefore includes every article in our three outlets that was focused on 
the health reforms during the entire period in which they were under government and 
media scrutiny. 
  
To quantitatively analyze the narratives of health reform across our sample we first 
looked at the issue attention cycle – the number of articles published each month. We 
then coded each article for its overall policy position, defined as “pro-public” 
(meaning in favor of a public sector health system with strong state role), “pro-
market” (meaning in favor of greater marketization or a bigger role for the private 
sector), “balanced” (setting out both pro-public and pro-market views or options 
equally), or “none” (expressing neither pro-public nor pro-market views). 3  We 
established these policy positions by reading media reports, by analyzing government 
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policy statements, and by using knowledge from our previous research, (see Duckett, 
2011). They are supported by Kornreich, Vertinsky and Potter (2012: 183—4), who 
have also found that differences of opinion between both “experts” and different 
Ministries within the central government cleaved broadly in this way: some experts 
and the Ministry of Health highly were critical of China’s previous two decades of 
commercializing marketizing health reforms, while pro-market experts, the Ministry 
of Finance and the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security were critical of 
state intervention in the health system and favored stimulating market competition 
and privatization.  
 
We thought it also important, however, to try and capture other narratives and policy 
positions in a bottom-up way, and so we also coded the articles for how they 
portrayed health system problems and understood their roots, as well as for the policy 
solutions they proposed. For this part of our analysis, we drew on the concept of the 
“frame”. According to Entman’s definition, frames define problems, diagnose causes 
and suggest remedies (Entman, 1993). On this basis, rather than trying to capture 
overall frames, we looked to identify their different dimensions. We therefore 
examined how our three publications portrayed the health system’s problems and 
causes, as well as the policy solutions they proposed. 
 
To identify the principal voices across our sample, we coded each article for the 
actors – for example representatives of government ministries or health sector 
businesses, doctors or ordinary members of the public – it mentioned, those it quoted 
or closely paraphrased, and those on whom it focused. We also qualitatively analyzed 
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the direct quotations in our 196 texts. We were then able to see how actors articulated 
their opinions and how different newspapers used their words.  
 
Finally, to probe the ideological underpinnings of our publications’ health reform 
reporting, we also examined the language they used. Here, we focused on whether 
reporting reflected what some researchers have identified as an early 21st century 
“renaissance of socialism and Marxism” and renewed emphasis on equality and 
justice found in formal statements of CCP ideology (Holbig, 2009) or whether they 
retained neo-liberal preferences that had dominated 1990s economic and social policy 
discussions. The CCP’s formal ideology has shifted substantially since 1978. Notably, 
the CCP first rejected Maoist egalitarianism and then under Jiang Zemin it formally 
extended its representation beyond its Maoist constituencies of workers and peasants 
to include all the population (and especially elites, according to Holbig, 2009), 
eventually in 2002 allowing private entrepreneurs to join the Party. At the same time, 
economic and social policies had favored marketization and commercialization and 
paid little attention to inequality. We do not seek, however, to engage in a detailed 
examination of the CCP’s overall ideology. Rather, we are interested in whether the 
terms that Heike Holbig has said were being revived in CCP’s populism and “socialist 
ideology” under Jiang’s successor, Hu Jintao, in the mid-2000s were found in its 
discussion of the health reforms at that time. According to Holbig, Hu introduced the 
notions of a “harmonious socialist society” (shehuizhuyi hexie shehui, 和谐社会) and 
concepts of rights and justice. We therefore searched our entire database of articles for 
these key new terms: “harmonious society”, “rights” and “justice”, as well as 
allegedly revived terms such as “socialism”, “Marxism” and “equality”, to see how 
frequently they were used and to analyze qualitatively how they were used.  
11 
 
 
Arguments 
We found noteworthy diversity in our sample, both in terms of the main positions and 
how these were articulated. People’s Daily and Beijing Youth News usually adopted a 
statist, “pro-public” position: advocating a stronger state role, more state investment 
and universal access to basic health services. But it was challenged – especially in 
Caijing – by pro-market voices that questioned the state’s ability to regulate the health 
system and fund universal access to care, and argued in favor of autonomy for doctors 
and a level playing field for private sector hospitals. In line with their diverse 
reporting on the direction of reform, our publications reproduced a clear state – 
market divide in the way they discussed the health system’s problems, understood 
their causes and proposed policy solutions. They also contained a separate, and much 
more muted, narrative around problems stemming from the poor rights and weak 
voice of vulnerable people. 
 
The media debate clearly centered on whether the health system should be more 
marketized or there should be a greater role for the state. Our bottom-up coding of 
problems and solutions did reveal some other issues, but they were marginal. We 
found, however, that the core market-versus-state debate contained sub-narratives 
around how to improve doctor-patient relations, the quality of primary care, hospital 
management and rural health provision. But our papers rarely discussed patient rights 
and choice – issues common to health debates in the United Kingdom and United 
States (see for example Mann et al., 1994; Mol, 2008) – though Caijing maintained a 
strong narrative around doctors’ freedom and autonomy.  
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The dominant “pro-public” media position was underpinned by concerns that ordinary 
people found health care unaffordable and needed to be made more accessible. The 
rhetoric, however, was more populist than socialist. It was “populist” in its concern 
with providing services fairly for all – using the language of popular appeal on a non-
ideological (neither explicitly “left” nor “right”) basis to the needs of “the people” 
(Dickson, 2005).4 It did not privilege particular groups (workers, for example, as in 
classic socialist rhetoric), and our publications referred much more frequently to a 
public welfare rather than to a socialist health system, and to fairness and justice 
rather than to equality. Even the People’s Daily, the CCP’s official national paper, 
made very few references to socialism, Marxism or Hu Jintao’s concept of a 
“harmonious society”. 
 
At the same time, the populism was paternalistic – elites and the media spoke for “the 
people” and debated their needs and benefits, but gave them little opportunity to voice 
their own views and preferences.5 As in liberal democracies, governmental and social 
elites dominated the reporting, and it was those elites who articulated the needs of 
ordinary people, with those people themselves rarely having the opportunity to 
directly express their opinions. Government officials (especially the Ministry of 
Health), “experts” and medical professionals’ voices came through in quotations, in 
interviews, and in opinion pieces. Ordinary people – whether rural or urban – were 
rarely quoted, while non-elite organizations were almost completely without voice 
and even less represented than they are in the media in liberal democracies. The 
marketized media in this authoritarian system allowed for some diversity, but the 
reporting was dominated by elites and unlike in liberal democracies recently there was 
no space for organized non-elite groups voice their issues.  
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We set out these findings in detail below. But first we summarize the trajectory of the 
health system reform that is the backdrop to our subsequent account of the media 
reporting.  
 
The health care reforms into the 21st Century 
To interpret China’s 21st century media reporting of health reform it is necessary to 
understand the recent history of the health care system. From the 1980s, reforms had 
substantially commercialized – some would say marketized – China’s public sector 
health system. State investment declined, rural small scale private practice grew, and 
public hospitals increasingly depended for income on medicine sales and then began 
to be privatized. From the late 1990s the problematic consequences of these changes 
became increasingly evident. The share of the population with risk protection – 
whether rural cooperative schemes or urban health insurance – had fallen (Duckett, 
2011). Commercialization, meanwhile, had fuelled the growth of specialist hospital 
provision while primary care suffered neglect. Health service providers, reliant on 
income from medicine sales, over-prescribed drugs and pushed up the cost of medical 
treatment. This in turn put care out of reach for the many without good health 
insurance (see for example Liu et al., 2001) and increased inequalities in access to 
health services (see for example Liu, 2004). In 2000, the World Health Organization 
ranked China 188 out of 191 countries in terms of the fairness of its health system 
(World Health Organization, 2000). 
 
It was soon after this that health was pushed up the political agenda. In early 2003, not 
long after Hu Jintao was appointed CCP Party Secretary, the SARS epidemic swept 
China, exposing the health system’s problems and demonstrating the domestic and 
14 
 
international political repercussions of its neglect. Then in late 2004, voices in the 
Ministry of Health began to reject a marketizing direction in health (Duckett, 2010). 
In January 2005, then Vice-Minister Gao Qiang (高强) reported that almost 50 per 
cent of people could not afford to see a doctor when they fell ill (People’s Daily 
Online, 2005), and in June and July the Ministry announced a shift toward more pro-
public policies (Nanfang Zhoumo, 2005). It was then that a report by the State 
Council’s Development Research Center hit the headlines. Co-authored by a number 
of social scientists including at least one closely associated with the Ministry of 
Health, the report condemned the previous two decades of “market-oriented” health 
reform.6  Toward the end of the same year and then in 2006, high profile health 
scandals in Harbin and Shenzhen also contributed to keeping health policy on the 
agenda.7 
 
With the health system now in the spotlight, the government initiated a policy review 
and consultation. In early August 2005, the Ministry of Health announced that 
together with other relevant departments it was formulating a new health reform 
program (Zhongguo Qingnianbao 2005). Then, in September 2006, the central party-
state set up a Health Reform Coordination Group, led by the National Development 
and Reform Commission (NDRC) and Ministry of Health, to consult with 
international and domestic health researchers and formulate a draft reform program. 
On 15 October 2008, the NDRC finally published for consultation a much anticipated 
draft health reform program. Following this, the CCP Central Committee and State 
Council in April 2009 issued their “Opinions on Deepening the Medical and Health 
Care System Reform” (hereafter, “the Opinions”) along with implementation and 
investment plans. The Opinions made a clear commitment to a public sector health 
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provision and access to basic services for all, but left space for private and for-profit 
provision as well as for experiments with public hospital reform. 
 
Government-led reporting, not Party-state control 
The press reporting of the health system policy debates across the 2005—09 review 
period was often “government-led” – following governmental moves or events in the 
policy process. If we look across the newspapers in our sample at the “issue attention 
cycle” – how the articles in our sample are distributed over the 2005—09 period (see 
Figure 1) – we see five out of six spikes in reporting coincide with government 
activities and policy discussions. Three spikes coincide with the major (and 
simultaneous) annual meetings in March (2007—9) of the National People’s Congress 
(NPC, China’s legislature) and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference (CPPCC, a national consultative body of non-CCP representatives), 
where the media follow closely discussions on a range of policies, including health. 
Other major spikes appear in October 2008 and in April 2009 when the government 
released a draft of the reform program for public consultation and then published the 
final document. Note also that while health scandals in 2005 and 2006 may have 
helped keep health reform in the media, they did not directly drive its reporting: in our 
sample of articles focused on health system reform, only five mentioned the Harbin 
and Shenzhen scandals. 
 
[Figure 1 about here]  
 
But government-led reporting is quite different from state censorship: government 
initiatives and official sources often drive reporting in liberal democracies, too (see 
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Bennett and Livingston, 2003; Bennett, 1990; Cook, 1998; Lawrence, 2000, chapter 
1). And there are indications that (in support of interviews with two journalists, see 
Note 1) the CCP’s Propaganda Department did not directly control health reporting in 
the late 2000s. First, the media speculated over when the government would publish 
its reform program, with conjecture in December 2007 sufficient to create a spike in 
the number of published articles. These articles noted that the health reform program 
had not been published this year as promised, ruminated on its content and asked 
when the government would make its decisions (e.g. Su 2007; Zhang et al 2007). 
Even People’s Daily asked why the program had not been published, and noted that 
decision making was being pushed along by public opinion (Bai 2007).  
 
Second, Caijing and Beijing Youth News published robust analysis of policy 
developments and the interests shaping policy making, sometimes using anonymous 
“authoritative” sources (Bai 2007). Indeed, the Ministry of Health, apparently 
frustrated by some reporting, at one point called publicly for an end to media 
speculation on the direction of reform. On 20 September 2006, for example, Beijing 
Youth News reported that the government had decided to adopt “the United Kingdom 
model” of public provision of basic health care for all. This and discussions of the 
United Kingdom (UK) versus German and US models in other publications provoked 
a Ministry of Health spokesperson to appeal – in People’s Daily – for restraint:  
 
“the 11-department Health System Reform Coordinating Group has 
just been set up, is still at the research stage, has not issued a health 
reform program, and the “models” argument does not exist. The so-
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called “models argument” is a false topic, and we hope the media will 
not blindly argue [about it]” (Bai 2006).  
 
Third, the Ministry of Health (we found no mention of other ministries doing the 
same) held regular monthly press conferences and convened other meetings to convey 
its views – a very different means of influencing reporting from the traditional one of 
the Party Propaganda Department dispatching directives to newspaper editors. In 
November 2005 for example, the Ministry held a “media exchange meeting” (meiti 
jiaoliu hui, 媒体交流会), to “informally publicize” health reform developments, to state 
that health reform would prioritize “public welfare” and to reject the Development 
Research Center report’s conclusions that health reform had “basically failed” (Cai 
2005). Similarly, in August 2007 the Ministry convened a “General Editors’ Forum 
on the Special Nature of Health Reporting and Health Reform Trends” in an effort to 
“strengthen communication between health departments and the media” and increase 
media understanding of “the challenges of national health work”. Ministry 
representatives spoke at the forum – attended by editors of official (rather than 
market-oriented) newspapers – on “how to see health issues” and the principles and 
direction of health reform  (Jiankangbao, 2007). 
 
Narratives of health system reform, ideology, representation and voice  
A dominant “pro-public” policy position challenged  
Lack of direct Party-state censorship is also evident in the diverse media positions 
over the direction of health system reform. A central narrative in the 2005—09 
reporting was whether there should be further “marketization” of the health system or 
a greater role for the “government” (zhengfu, 政府 – the closest Chinese equivalent to 
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the term “state”) and public sector. But across all three publications only half of 
articles (48 per cent) favored a greater governmental role in line with the direction 
endorsed by the Ministry of Health, and a noteworthy 21 per cent advocate a 
contrarian “pro-market” (9 per cent) or “balanced” direction (12 per cent) (see Table 
1). 8 
 
There were, however, significant differences in the prevalence of pro-public and pro-
market articles across our three publications, with People’s Daily strongly pro-public 
(75 per cent), Beijing Youth News more moderately so (41 per cent) and Caijing 
significantly more pro-market (35 per cent of articles). Indeed, Caijing set out to 
challenge the dominant policy position in robust contrarian fashion. In July 2005, for 
example, in a piece written by Editor-in-Chief Hu Shuli herself, Caijing likened 
universal health insurance to the Great Leap Forward and suggested that it would 
have similarly disastrous consequences (Hu 2005).  
 
[Table 1 about here]  
 
The pro-market challenge first surged, and then declined, however, indicating a 
falling into line as the reform program crystallized. Pro-market articles grew from 11 
per cent of the total in 2005 to 22 per cent in 2006, but then fell back to seven, nine 
and two per cent in the subsequent three years (see Figure 2). In fact, 41 per cent of all 
the pro-market articles appeared in 2006, with their share falling to 24 per cent in both 
2007 and 2008, and to 6 per cent in 2009. Articles taking a “balanced” stance grew 
between 2007 and 2009, however, indicating continued – if less outspoken – support 
for markets. In part the declining share of pro-market reporting reflects the fact that 
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there was a general increase over time in articles reporting on the review process 
rather than on the content of the debate. It may also reflect the fact that the draft 
policy document issued for consultation in October 2008 indicated a compromise 
position on the state versus market issue. The pro-market media then moved from 
arguing for marketization to questioning the affordability of the government package 
and promised state investment. 
 
 [Figure 2 about here]  
 
Differential diagnoses: socialism, populism and neo-liberalism  
The media’s frequently pro-public stance – particularly in People’s Daily – might 
indicate an ideologically-driven socialist resurgence to challenge the pro-market 
1990s health reforms. To look more closely at the ideological underpinnings of the 
policy stances, as well as to identify other narratives, we coded each article on how it 
portrayed the health system’s problems, allowing coding of multiple factors (where 
they existed) in any given article. We found that People’s Daily and Beijing Youth 
News prioritized problems – from affordability to medical corruption – that affect 
ordinary people, but discussed them in populist, rather than in socialist terms. Caijing, 
in contrast, more often took a pro-market stance and concentrated more on elite 
economic issues and the concerns of the medical profession. 
 
Our publications’ top two most reported problems with the current health system were 
poor “affordability” (72 per cent, often expressed using the slogan “it is expensive and 
difficult to see a doctor” – “kan  bing gui, kan bing nan”, 看病贵，看病难) and lack of 
universal access to services (49 per cent). These problems particularly dominated 
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People’s Daily (78 and 63 per cent) and Beijing Youth News (71 and 35 per cent), and 
were also significant in Caijing (58 and 50 per cent) (see Table 2).  
 
Close behind the social problem of poor access to health care was that of 
inefficiencies in the system – cited by 46 per cent of articles. This is not, however, 
simply a remnant neo-liberal strand in the health system reform narrative. Although in 
its concern for this issue Caijing stands out – with 71 per cent of its articles 
mentioning inefficiency as a problem – People’s Daily and Beijing Youth News also 
raise it (54 and 31 per cent of articles respectively), while criticizing the high share of 
hospital revenues derived from medicine sales and its inflationary effects.  
 
Our publications also discussed other problems of popular concern: corruption and 
bribery in the medical sector (21 per cent), conflict between doctors and patients, and 
the social unrest or unhappiness (both found in 12 per cent of articles) created by the 
health system. They did not, however, connect these issues with the CCP leadership’s 
stated goal of promoting greater “social harmony”. When reporting health system 
reform between 2005 and 2009 our publications used the term “harmonious society” 
only 16 times. Given the widespread (and widely-reported) “patient-doctor conflict” 
in China (LaFraniere, 12 August, 2010; Waldmeir, 12 October, 2012) perhaps 
mentioning “harmony” might have been seen as critical of Hu Jintao or as 
highlighting Party-state failures.  
 
Our newspapers were similarly sparing in their use of socialist terminology. The term 
“socialism” itself occurred in only 18 of our 196 articles – and in only six articles 
published by the CCP’s national paper, People’s Daily. Marxism was not mentioned 
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at all. Discussions of affordability and access, meanwhile, avoided referring to 
inequality – even though it is a central concept in socialist ideology and important in 
the CCP’s early 21st century ideological reformulations (Holbig, 2009). Our 
publications used “unequal” (bu pingdeng, 不平等) only six times, while “equality” 
(pingdeng 平等, which has socialist, even egalitarian, connotations) was used only a 
further 21 times in 196 articles (and in only five People’s Daily articles). Just as 
notably, only in eight articles was equal (or unequal) access to health services the 
issue – a common concern in international health policy circles as well as in China 
and in this context not necessarily involving any socialist connotations. Indeed, while 
Caijing mentioned equality the most, it was not to support more equal access to 
services, but rather to press for equal competition for private hospitals in the health 
care marketplace.9  
 
Even when discussing access and availability of services to the population, the media 
chose not the classic socialist rhetoric of equality but instead used the more liberal 
language of “evenness” (jundeng, 均等) and “fairness” (gongping, 公平). Evenness (in 
the sense of balance) was used a total of 70 times, and fairness a total of 167 times. 
The word “fairness” occurred 76 times in People’s Daily, 36 times in Caijing and 60 
times in Beijing Youth News. “Evenness” occurred 28, 12, and 30 times respectively.  
But our publications used “justice” (zhengyi, 正义– a concept Holbig argues is 
important in early 21st century CCP ideology – only 11 times. 
 
There were limits, however, to the media’s liberal narrative. Although articles often 
discussed health system reform in pro-market, neo-liberal economic terms, they paid 
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little attention to other issues that often dominate in health reform internationally. In 
debates about health care systems in the US (Annas, 1995) and UK (Greener, 2004), 
for example, “patient (or consumer) choice” has been central. In contrast, the Chinese 
media referred infrequently to choice (three per cent of articles) or to value for money 
(four per cent), even in pro-market articles (where they were mentioned in six per cent 
of the sample). Although market advocates internationally often invoke patient 
choice, in China they do not.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Root causes and responsibilities: state underinvestment or insufficient marketization? 
Underpinning the media’s dominant pro-public policy stance, was a broad consensus 
that state underinvestment (mentioned in 58 per cent of articles) and earlier pro-
market reforms were to blame for health system problems, either directly (19 per cent) 
or – more frequently – because of their effects: making hospitals (34 per cent), 
doctors (21 per cent) and pharmaceutical companies (12 per cent) profit-driven, or in 
other ways creating the wrong economic incentives (17 per cent) (see Table 3).  
 
But on this issue, too, the media published opposing views, sometimes describing 
problems as the result not of marketization but of its poor implementation. Similarly, 
13 per cent of articles saw the cause as insufficient marketization, and 12 per cent 
blamed government interference or monopoly. Caijing in particular tended to take this 
stance or challenge views that health system problems were merely a result of 
marketization: “simply using ‘marketization’ to affirm or refute the previous stage of 
health system reform, is too general” (Song, 2006). Even if it disagreed with them, 
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Beijing Youth News, too, reported that some people blamed overweening government 
for the health system’s problems: “now, as soon as you start talking about how 
expensive it is to see a doctor, everyone will say, oh my goodness, it is mainly the 
government monopoly, [and] not enough competition, that’s leading to such high 
prices” (Beijing Youth News, 2008).  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
What is to be done? The state should invest but free China’s doctors 
The media reporting of solutions to health system problems followed a similar 
pattern, with dominant pro-public positions challenged by a pro-market minority. All 
the most frequently suggested solutions involved the state playing a bigger role: more 
state spending (57 per cent of articles) and a stronger state role and more regulation 
(49 per cent), and improving primary care through more government investment (39 
per cent) (see Table 4). But a substantial number of articles suggested solutions 
associated with more pro-market positions: improving (rather than increasing) 
regulation and reorganizing hospitals (29 per cent); increasing market competition or 
expanding the number of players in the private sector (19 per cent); and leveling the 
playing field (for market competition) between private and public sector (13 per cent). 
 
Similarly, solutions involving health sector workers sometimes implied a greater state 
role, but also sometimes backed greater freedom for doctors. The most common 
solution – to improve doctors’ training (in 14 per cent of articles that proposed 
solutions) – suggests more state investment. But others – increasing professional 
independence (13 per cent) and giving hospitals more autonomy and responsibility (7 
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per cent) – implicitly blame over-regulation. Professionalization and autonomy are 
often key medical profession demands in liberal democracies and align with 
preferences for less interference. In line with this, we found that pro-public articles 
more often mentioned training (19 per cent versus none), while pro-market articles 
more often mentioned independence and autonomy (29 versus four per cent of the 
sub-samples respectively for professional independence and 18 versus seven per cent 
for hospital autonomy).  
 
At the margins, the media also framed the health reforms more fundamentally in 
liberal “rights” terms. A rare “solution”, for example, was to “expand rights and voice 
of ordinary people and vulnerable groups” (six per cent). People’s Daily noted that 
issuing the consultation document was “respecting citizens’ rights” (Xie, 2008), and 
pointed out that the 17th Party Congress (in Autumn 2007) had affirmed that all 
people, regardless of age, employment, location or ability to pay, had the same rights 
to basic health services (People’s Daily, 2009). Beijing Youth News meanwhile called 
for health reform to respect the rights of the vulnerable (Ding et al., 2005), and for 
rights for stakeholders – especially patients and rural dwellers – to participate in the 
decision making process (Guo 2007a, 2007b). Caijing, however, tended more often to 
focus on the rights of doctors – to write prescriptions without interference and to 
make money – than vulnerable groups (Caijing, 2008, 2009; Zhang 2006).  
 
[Table 4 about here]  
 
Representation and voice: elites dominate paternalist populism  
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The pro-public narrative around health reform was also strongly paternalist and 
populist, with governmental and social elites dominating the coverage and speaking 
for “the masses” or “old-one hundred names” – especially in People’s Daily and 
Beijing Youth News (see Tables 5 and 6). Governmental actors were mentioned in 83 
per cent of articles, and quoted in 58 per cent. 10 Among them, the main actor was the 
Ministry of Health (mentioned in 44 per cent of the articles and quoted in 32 per 
cent), which led the pro-public narrative. While other ministries reportedly held very 
different opinions on the direction of health reform (Beijing Youth News, 2007; 
Kornreich, Vertinsky, and Potter, 2012; Zhao and Ren, 2007) they were quoted much 
less. The pro-market Ministry of Finance was mentioned in 15 per cent of the articles 
and quoted in only seven per cent, while the Ministry of Human Resources and Social 
Security (in charge of health insurance and reportedly in favor of supply side rather 
than demand-side controls) was mentioned in 11 per cent of the articles and quoted in 
three per cent. Even when quoted, moreover, these ministries presented facts (for 
example spending figures) rather than opinion. The Ministry of Health, however, was 
sometimes challenged, particularly in Caijing, which called one of its reform 
initiatives a “dead end”, and twisted its words to support pro-market arguments 
(Caijing, 2009). 
 
Although the media mentioned ordinary people – as “patients”, “the people” and 
“rural people” – in 60 per cent of articles, their voices were weak. Our publications 
quoted them in only 14 per cent of stories, making them objects of policy rather than 
active participants (and this despite Beijing Youth News’s occasional plea for people 
to be more included in the policy process). They had more voice than Zhao (2003) 
found in her study of WTO reporting, but they were usually quoted only to express 
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personal experiences and feelings rather than politicized opinions about the health 
system or its reform.  
 
In contrast, the media gave both experts and representatives of elite interest groups 
much greater voice. Experts were mentioned in 41 per cent of the articles and quoted 
in 31 per cent, and they frequently contributed opinion pieces or lengthy interviews. 
Although more heavily quoted in Caijing, they also appeared regularly in People’s 
Daily, where – as in Party journalism more generally – they have historically played a 
marginal role (Zhao, 2003). These experts were predominantly from Chinese 
institutions (only 12 per cent were from international organizations, 24 per cent for 
the Caijing sample), with most based in elite universities and research academies. 
They often drew lessons from other countries and their health systems – in Caijing 
using these lessons to make pro-market arguments and in Beijing Youth News to make 
pro-public ones.  
 
The media also gave members of elite interest groups – especially medical 
professionals and business people – space to express their views, though usually as 
individuals rather than as representatives of associations. Our media mentioned 
businesses (including those in health insurance and pharmaceuticals) in 14 per cent of 
articles and quoted them in seven per cent. But they quoted medical professionals 
more: hospital managers spoke in 15 per cent of articles (31 per cent in Caijing), and 
doctors and medical association representatives in 14 per cent. Most of these 
quotations were by individual doctors, rather than their associations, but nonetheless 
medical professionals were able to demands resources as they often do in health 
policy debates in many Western democracies. In China’s health reform debate, for 
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example, they wanted resources to compensate for removing medicine as a source of 
income. 
 
In liberal democracies, too, governmental elites tend to dominate the media, while 
representatives of pressure and interest groups – especially those representing 
industries and businesses – also play an important role in the coverage of policy 
debates (Binderkrantz, 2012; Danielian and Page, 1994; Wolsfled, 2011). Despite 
these similarities in patterns of interest articulation, however, one stark difference lies 
in the almost complete absence in the Chinese media of any mention of – or voice for 
– organized, non-elite interest groups (see also Chen et al., 2012). The number of 
these kinds of groups and their presence in the media has become increasingly 
common in liberal western democracies and in particular in relation to health policy 
(Binderkrantz, 2012). Our publications, however, despite their attention to the plight 
of ordinary people and patients, deprived consumer or patient associations and labor 
groups of any direct voice. Patients have few organizations to represent them, and 
those that exist are small and weak, representing narrow groups of patients with 
particular illnesses (see Duckett, 2007). These were entirely absent in the coverage. 
Neither was there mention of the government-controlled unions and only one 
quotation from a farmer’s organization.  
 
[Tables 5 and 6 about here] 
 
Conclusion  
The central media narrative of China’s health system reform – marketization versus a 
stronger state role – has pervaded health system debates around the world since at 
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least the 1980s. So, too, does freedom and autonomy for the medical profession, a 
theme championed by Caijing. But the similarities end there. Our publications only 
rarely mentioned patient choice and rights – usually core to the liberal pro-market 
health debates arguments in Europe and the United States. Pro-market opposition to 
the mainstream government position in China focused primarily on the concerns of 
the medical elites. 
 
But while pro-market media views were elitist, so was socialism muted, even in the 
CCP’s national paper, People’s Daily. Indeed, the differences between the CCP 
ideology as articulated by its ideologues, and the ideological underpinnings of health 
reform narratives as articulated particularly in the CCP newspaper People’s Daily, 
raise questions. Is the Party’s official ideology merely a veneer that is unconnected 
with real-world policy making?  Or does their commitment to socialist ideals simply 
fail to survive in the political rough-and-tumble of health policy making? Perhaps, for 
example, the CCP leadership is unwilling to promise equality in access to health care 
because it is would be so expensive or so politically difficult to achieve given the 
enormous urban-rural re-allocation of resources it requires. Alternatively, perhaps the 
CCP is afraid to discuss the health care system in socialist terms because this would 
serve only to highlight the distance between ideology and reality.11 
 
The paternalist populism of People’s Daily and Beijing Youth News reporting, like 
Caijing’s elitist neo-liberalism, in part reflects the weakness of non-elite interest 
groups and civil society in China. It may also reflect some media self-censorship, with 
editors fearful of crossing the line and giving too much space to unfettered public 
opinion. The state—market debate, in contrast, involves fewer risks. But the state 
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versus market debate in health reform is part of a wider national debate over the 
balance between state and market across economic and social policy arenas.12 And 
with the media reporting dominated by governmental and social elites, the diversity of 
views on the direction of health system reform was evidently the result of a rift that 
has emerged – or widened – among those elites, now that some parts of the Party-state 
(the Ministry of Health) are no longer advocating market reforms that benefit 
business.13 Zhao (2003), in her study of the media reporting of China’s entry to the 
WTO, argued that uniformly positive narratives were the product not of state 
censorship but of a consensus among governmental and economic elites as well as the 
urban middle classes on the benefits of neo-liberal globalization. Only five years after 
China’s entry to the WTO (in 2001), however, the neoliberal elite consensus reported 
by Zhao had broken down as a new dominant narrative – at least on the health issue – 
in favor of government investment and regulation was challenged by an outspoken 
pro-market minority sometimes scathing in its attacks on government interference.    
 
Perhaps, then, diversity in reporting is due to new elite discord. But perhaps previous 
studies of China’s media reporting have overstated the state’s centralized control 
because they focused on international policy issues and highly sensitive domestic 
issues that are often “sanctioned”, meaning they “can be reported about, but need to 
be censored” (Stockmann, 2011: 276). Health system reform was not a sanctioned 
topic (but  see Sun, 2010), and hence the media provided a forum for, and contributed 
to, a more open debate. Whether such debates are evident in other domestic policy 
issues deserves further research. 
 Figure 1: The distribution of articles on health system reform, 2005
*In the three publications in our sample, 
Caijing. 
 
 
 
Table 1: The dominant policy position
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Figure 2: Policy position by year 
 
 
 
Table 2: Health system problems reported  
 
 PD CM BYN All 
 n % n % n % n % 
Cost for individuals/affordability 49 78 14 58 48 71 111 72 
Lack of universal access 40 63 12 50 24 35 76 49 
Inefficiency (sub-optimal allocation of resources) 34 54 17 71 21 31 72 46 
Corruption/bribery in the medical sector 11 17 4 17 18 26 33 21 
Creates conflict/disputes between doctors & patients  5 8 4 17 10 15 19 12 
Causes social unrest/masses are unhappy 8 13 2 8 8 12 18 12 
Poor quality of care 10 16 1 4 6 9 17 11 
Poor value for money for individual consumer/patient 2 3 0 0 4 6 6 4 
Restricted consumer/patient choice/freedom  2 3 2 8 0 0 4 3 
Hinders economic development 1 2 1 4 2 3 4 3 
Other 5 8 2 8 11 16 18 12 
N = 155 articles. Articles that did not refer to any problems were excluded. Columns add to more than 
100 because some articles mentioned more than one problem.  
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Table 3: Root, causes or responsibilities reported 
 
  PD CM BYN All 
  n % n % n % n % 
Low levels of state investment 29 56 15 65 34 57 78 58 
Hospitals profit-driven 28 54 4 17 14 23 46 34 
Doctors profit-driven/poor ethics 13 25 4 17 12 20 29 21 
Market forces/marketization 8 15 3 13 14 23 25 19 
Perverse/wrong economic incentives  10 19 5 22 8 13 23 17 
Insufficient marketization 3 6 11 48 3 5 17 13 
Pharmaceutical companies profit-driven 7 13 2 9 7 12 16 12 
State/government interference 4 8 7 30 5 8 16 12 
Doctors. poor training/resources/pay 5 10 1 4 6 10 12 9 
China’s low economic development 1 2 2 9 8 13 11 8 
Local governments 4 8 1 4 4 7 9 7 
Patients' consumerism 3 6 2 9 4 7 9 7 
Increasing costs of health care 4 8 2 9 0 0 6 4 
Hospitals: poor management/resources 0 0 1 4 2 3 3 2 
Other 12 23 2 9 9 15 23 17 
N = 135. Articles that did not refer to any causes were excluded. Columns add to more than 100 
because some articles mentioned more than one cause.  
 
 
 
Table 4: Health system reform solutions reported 
 
  PD CM BYN All 
  n % n % n % n % 
More state spending 34 52 11 50 46 64 91 57 
Greater public/state role; stronger/more regulation 37 56 6 27 35 49 78 49 
Improve primary care (with state investment) 33 50 7 32 23 32 63 39 
Better [NOT more] regulation  15 23 14 64 17 24 46 29 
Increase/expand market competition 2 3 15 68 13 18 30 19 
Improve doctors’ training (including ethics) 14 21 0 0 9 13 23 14 
Leveling playing field for private and public hospitals 9 14 6 27 6 8 21 13 
Greater independence to  
doctors  & health professionals 2 3 8 36 10 14 20 13 
Greater autonomy and responsibility to hospitals 6 9 1 5 4 6 11 7 
Greater rights to ordinary people/vulnerable groups 4 6 1 5 5 7 10 6 
Other 14 21 1 5 8 11 23 14 
N = 160. Articles that did not refer to any solutions were excluded. Columns add to more than 100 
because some articles mentioned more than one solution.  
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Table 5: Actors mentioned  
 
 PD CM BYN All 
n* 
% 
art** n* 
% 
art** n* 
% 
art** n* 
% 
art** 
Government officials 48 72 21 81 93 90 162 83 
Patients/public 54 81 13 50 50 49 117 60 
Managers and hospitals 43 64 15 58 36 35 94 48 
Experts 26 39 17 65 38 37 81 41 
Doctors & medical associations 23 34 14 54 35 34 72 37 
Industry (business, pharmaceutical, 
insurance) 11 16 6 23 11 11 28 14 
Media 1 1 3 12 15 15 19 10 
Rural/worker/consumer associations 3 4 0 0 2 2 5 3 
Others 10 15 2 8 13 13 25 13 
Note: Columns add to more than 100 because some articles mentioned more than one group of actors.  
* Refers to the total number of times that an actor is mentioned. 
** Refers to the percentage of articles that mention an actor in that publication’s sample.  
 
 
 
Table 6: Actors quoted  
 
 
 
PD CM BYN All  
n* 
% 
art** n* 
% 
art** n* 
% 
art** n* 
% 
art** 
Government officials 29 43 17 65 68 66 114 58 
Experts 19 28 14 54 27 26 60 31 
Hospital managers 13 19 8 31 9 9 30 15 
Doctors & medical associations 9 13 7 27 11 11 27 14 
Patients/public 13 19 5 19 9 9 27 14 
Industry (business, pharmaceutical, 
insurance) 4 6 4 15 6 6 14 7 
Media 1 1 0 0 11 11 12 6 
Rural/worker/consumer associations 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Others 4 6 1 4 5 5 10 5 
Note: Columns add to more than 100 because some articles quoted more than one group of actors. 
* Refers to the total number of times that an actor is quoted. 
** Refers to the percentage of articles that quote an actor in that publication’s sample.  
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NOTES 
 
                                                 
1
 This is based on interviews with a magazine editor in June 2011 and a Chinese 
newspaper journalist in December 2011. 
2
 We do not translate Caijing’s title because it is widely known among non-Chinese 
speakers by its Chinese name.. 
3
 We piloted and on this basis adjusted our coding frame. The articles then were coded 
by three trained, native Chinese speakers. The inter-coder reliability, based on a 20% 
sub-sample, was 90%. Only interpretative variables were included in this calculation.  
4
 This ‘authoritarian populism’ differs from the often anti-establishment populism 
found in democratic political systems (see Canovan, 1999). Note that Holbig (2009, 
pp. 26-7) also interprets the Hu Jintao administration as more populist than its 
predecessor under Jiang Zemin. 
5
 For a definition of paternalism, see Dworkin (2010). Although not all the media 
reporting discussed issues of forcing people to act against their own will – for 
example requiring them to pay health insurance contributions – reporting was 
paternalist in that it discussed what to do in the best interest of ordinary people but did 
so on their own behalf rather than giving them a voice. 
6
 The ‘report’ consisted of papers in a special supplement of the Development 
Research Centre’s journal, Zhongguo fazhan pinglun (China Development Review) 
Vol. 7, No. 1, March 2005. 
7
 In late November 2005 China Central Television reported a case in which a patient 
in Harbin died of cancer leaving his family to pay medical bills amounting to several 
million yuan (Zhang 2005). In late December 2006, a dispute in Shenzhen between 
the doctors and family of a patient became notorious because the medical staff 
involved felt so threatened that they began to wear hard hats to work.  
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8
 Only one fifth (21%) of articles did not take a position. Note that to be coded for a 
policy position, an article did not have to directly advocate a particular policy 
direction; it could merely reproduce another actor’s position. 
9
 Caijing mentioned equality the most despite (because of its magazine format) having 
fewer articles on health reform than the two newspapers in our sample. Its articles are 
relatively long however. Of a total of 412,833 words (Chinese characters) in the 196 
articles in our sample, Caijing accounted for 28%, People’s Daily for 32%, and 
Beijing Youth News for 40%. 
10
 Note that it is also common for governmental sources to dominate in liberal 
democracies, especially for routine policy issues (Bennett and Livingston, 2003; 
Bennett, 1990; Cook, 1998). 
11
 Thanks to Lű Aofei for this point.  
12
 The wider debate has been over the ‘advance of the state and retreat of the people’ 
(guo jin min tui). 
13 Caijing’s pro-market stance resembles those of its business orientation and 
readership—whose interests apparently have diverged from those of the Hu Jintao 
leadership on health policy. 
